El propósito de la investigación será analizar algunos textos de Ferdinand Ebner y de Emmanuel Levinas, con el fin de considerar a la persona, al mismo tiempo, apelada y libre respondiente al llamado: pasividad y actividad constitutivas de su existencia. Desde la Antigüedad, se ha considerado que la capacidad de «tener palabra» (λόγον ἔχον) es el elemento que nos distingue del resto de los animales; sin embargo, el tratamiento filosófico que recibió la noción de ‘palabra’ (λόγος, verbum), en la mayoría (...) de las ocasiones restó el carácter dialógico, trascendente o comunitario, acentuando ¾en mayor medida¾ el carácter lógico, inmanente o íntimo de la persona. Considero que el personalismo puede volver a ser esa provocación filosófica que, a modo de gozne, ayude a reunir los polos gnoseológico y ético, tan comúnmente disociados, a través de una antropología que considere a la palabra como intimidad en apertura y comunión responsable. (shrink)

El artículo busca exponer el pensamiento de Emmanuel Levinas en su obra Humanismo del otro hombre en torno a cuatro cuestiones fundamentales: identidad, relación, libertad y trascendencia. Opuesta a la postura de Nietzsche y de otros autores modernos respecto a cada una de estas cuestiones, Levinas presentará una solución paradójica a estas cuatro grandes claves antropológicas que sirven de fundamento para elaborar una teoría de la justicia: la identidad será entendida como vulnerabilidad; la relación como heteronomía; la libertad como diaconía (...) y Obra; la ética como el encuentro religioso fundamental. (shrink)

The well known conference of Paul Ricœur ‘Love and Justice’, pronounced when he received Leopold Lucas award in 1989, shows a dialectical tension between those two notions, and searches deeper in the philosophical –and even theological– basis that reveals love as rectification and safeguard of justice; without love, justice would be cruel, utilitarian and, paradoxically, unfair, remembering us the old Roman adage: “summum ius, summa iniuria”. Moreover, Levinas, in his “Talmudic Lesson on Justice”, compiled after in New Talmudic Readings, presents (...) a less intuitive position, but no less interesting: justice is the place of forgiveness and love, it becomes humane everything it touches, and that’s why it doesn’t need correction; a justice that needed love, had maybe never been true justice. Here lies a critic that complements and improves both, the theory exposed by Paul Ricœur and its Rawlsian basis. (shrink)

This research aims to analyses Leibniz’ Monadologic Ontology and his theory of expression as opposed to those readings of Leibniz’ work that define monads as isolated entities that lack that all possible relation. The analysis will also show that, beyond his notion of Personal Identity, underlies a logic of Otherness able to dialogue with contemporary Personalism. This logic of otherness, if our reading of Leibniz is right, it is especially ostensible in the ‘spirits’, which expressive nature establish not only a (...) systematic bond with the totality of beings that integrate the world, but also a notion of Personal Identity. Such notion allows that otherness acquires a prescriptive character: to place us in other’s situation and thus understand their needs and, through this, acknowledge our place in the cosmos. In order to achieve this we will carry four tasks: first, we will analyze in depth the application of his theory of expression to Monadologic ontology and his notio completa. Second, we will appreciate what implicatures have both for the specific case of spirits, emphasizing the communitarian nature of these rational monads. Third, we will rebuild a Leibnizian theory of Personal Identity and finally, we will compare the results with the main Personalists’ body of thesis. (shrink)